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I.
INTRODUCTION
Most theories of judicial independence place a great emphasis on selection
mechanisms for judges.' An appointment mechanism that appears to link the
selected judge too closely to the appointing body calls into question whether the
judge can be relied upon to deliver neutral, legitimate, high-quality decisions.
While there is near-universal consensus on this as a matter of theory, legal sys-
tems diverge greatly in the ways in which they appoint judges, as each tries to
balance independence with accountability through institutional design. The di-
versity of systems of judicial selection suggests a lack of consensus on the best
manner to guarantee independence.2
American states are exceptional in the range and variety of judicial ap-
pointment systems they employ, including various forms of election, appoint-
ment by political authorities, and the use of judicial commissions.3 The merits
of these various methods are hotly debated among scholars and state policymak-
ers, with each method having its advocates.4 However, it is safe to say the
1. There is a large body of literature on judicial independence and quality. See, e.g., Richard
A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 827; Eli Salzberger & Paul Fenn, Judicial Independence: Some Evidence from the
English Court ofAppeal, 42 J.L. & ECON. 831 (1999); F. Andrew Hanssen, Is There a Politically
Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 712 (2004); Irving R. Kaufman, The
Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671 (1980); Daniel M. Klerman & Paul G.
Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth Century England, 7 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2005); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in
an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling
(In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994); J. Mark Ram-
seyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan,
13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997); McNollgast, Conditions for Judicial Independence, 15 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 105 (2006). For a more comparative perspective, see Josefina Calcafio de
Temeltas, Commentary, To Promote and Strengthen Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law in
the Hemisphere, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 997 (1996).
2. See generally APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006).
3. Kurt E. Scheuerman, Comment, Rethinking Judicial Elections, 72 OR. L. REV. 459 (1993)
(providing overview of selection mechanisms); American Judicature Society on Judicial Selection in
the States, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial-selectionmaterials/index.cfm (last visited Oct.
23, 2008).
4. Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific Literature, 106 DICK. L.
REV. 729 (2002) (providing summary of empirical evidence); Luke Bierman, Preserving Power in
Picking Judges: Merit Selection for the New York Court of Appeals, 60 ALB. L. REV. 339 (1996)
(advocating merit system for New York); Norman L. Greene, Perspectives on Judicial Selection
Reform: The Need to Develop a Model Appointive Selection Plan for Judges in Light of Experience,
68 ALB. L. REV. 597 (2005) (determining the merit system is superior); Steven Zeidman, Judicial
Politics: Making the Case for Merit Selection, 68 ALB. L. REV. 713 (2005); Lawrence H. Averill, Jr.,
Observations on the Wyoming Experience with Merit Selection of Judges: A Model for Arkansas, 17
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 281 (1995) (Arkansas); Sara S. Greene, et. al., On the Validity and
Vitality ofArizona 's Judicial Merit Selection System: Past, Present, and Future, 34 FORDHAM URI.
L.J. 239 (2007) (Arizona); Victoria Cecil, Merit Selection and Retention: The Great Compromise?
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scholarly literature assumes that merit selection-involving nonpartisan judicial
commissions rather than elections or appointment by politicians-is the optimal
way to ensure independence. 5 We thus see the emergence of a new ortho-
doxy-merit selection is good and other methods are retrograde. Because there
are few common metrics to evaluate the comparative independence or quality of
American state judiciaries, the new scholarly consensus is largely theoretical,
built on anecdotal rather than systematic evidence. 6
We look at this question from a comparative perspective, using evidence
and experiences from other countries to inform this debate. Many foreign juris-
dictions have adopted institutions known as judicial councils in recent years.
These institutions, which closely resemble merit selection plans, are designed to
help enhance judicial independence and external accountability and to strike a
balance between the two. This paper describes these institutions and provides
an economic theory of their formation and features. In another paper, we exam-
ine evidence as to whether different designs of judicial council affect judicial
quality. 7 Although we found little relation between council adoption and qual-
ity, we believe that the eternal struggle for a balance between independence and
accountability ensures that judicial councils-and by analogy, selection schemes
in American states-will continue to be a locus of institutional reform.
In this paper, we use law and economics to develop a theory of judicial
councils and examine the experiences of several countries in light of our theory.
First, we discuss the emergence of judicial councils and their American counter-
parts, merit selection commissions. We then provide an economic theory of the
Not Necessarily, 39 CT. REV. 20 (2002) (Florida); Jason J. Czarnezki, A Callfor Change: Improving
Judicial Selection Methods, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 169 (2005) (Wisconsin); Lenore L. Prather, Judicial
Selection: What is Right for Mississippi?, 21 MiSS. C. L. REV. 199 (2002) (Mississippi).
5. Reddick, supra note 4; Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures,
and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1994) (providing extensive history of merit selection and argu-
ing for the merit plan); Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Judicial Nominating Commissions: Independ-
ence, Accountability, and Public Support, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 73 (2007); Mark A. Behrens &
Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Court
Judges, 11 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 273 (2002) (arguing for appointment over election); Nor-
man L. Greene, The Judicial Independence Through Fair Appointments Act, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
13 (2007) (same); G. Alan Tarr, Designing an Appointive System: The Key Issues, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 291 (2007) (same); Jeffrey D. Jackson, Beyond Quality: First Principles in Judicial Selec-
tion and their Application to a Commission-Based Selection System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 125
(2007); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995) (weakening the rule of law through judicial elections).
6. But see Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians:
The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary (John M. Olin L. &
Econ., Working Paper No. 357, 2d series, 2007) (finding that judges in partisan systems are more
productive in terms of number of opinions, but that appointed judges are cited more frequently); Eric
A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial Bias Studies for
Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853 (2008) (arguing that judicial political bias
is not necessarily harmful).
7. Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial
Independence, 57 AM. J. COmp. L. 209 (2009).
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formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions along which
they differ. Next, we discuss the national experience of several legal systems in
light of our theory, and we conclude with a discussion of the implications of the
analysis for state judicial selection.
II.
THE TENSION BETWEEN ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE
8
A long and established literature argues that the ideal of judicial independ-
ence is a crucial quality of legal systems, and indeed inherent in the notion of
judging. 9 Naturally, the ideal is not always met, for it remains the case that in
every legal system judges are appointed and employed by the state. It would be
unusual indeed if judges did not have a role in implementing social policy,
broadly conceived. 10 Typically, then, in democracies, the degree of judicial in-
dependence actually granted reflects broad choices of the regime. It may make
sense, for example, to have relatively greater judicial independence in the eco-
nomic sphere so as to maintain credible commitments for investment. Alterna-
tively, liberal polities may wish to use judicial power to ensure a zone of
autonomy for individuals.
The delegation of power to judges implies some need for judicial account-
ability. While judicial independence has been widely studied," accountability
8. This section draws on Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 7.
9. See JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH
(Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002). In the introduction, the editors emphasize that
independence and accountability are different sides of the same coin. Furthermore, the editors rec-
ognize that judicial independence does not have the same meaning through time.
10. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981).
11. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Identifying "Independence", 86 B.U. L. REV. 1297 (2006)
(providing different concepts of judicial independence and arguing that there might be too much in-
dependence); Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL, L. REV.
315 (1999) (explaining judicial independence in contemporary American history); Archibald Cox,
The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 565 (1996) (dis-
cussing historical reasons for judicial independence); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Inde-
pendent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962
(2002) (arguing that independence and accountability aim at a well-functioning system of adjudica-
tion); John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41
(2002); John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independ-
ence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1999) (discussing institutional protections for judges and the judiciary
and explaining interest theories of judicial independence); Gordon Bermant & Russell R. Wheeler,
Federal Judges and the Judicial Branch: Their Independence and Accountability, 46 MERCER L.
REV. 835 (1995) (identifying different levels of independence, including decisional independence,
personal independence, procedural independence, administrative independence; and different levels
of accountability, namely internal versus external accountability); Frances Kahn Zemans, The Ac-
countable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 625 (1999) (discussing
institutional versus decisional independence); William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The
Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 Wis. L. REV. I (making the point that the shape of the court sys-
tem is too important to be left to the judiciary); Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay
of Preferences, Case Facts, Context, and Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206
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has been the subject of much less inquiry. 12 Accountability requires that the ju-
diciary as a whole maintain some level of responsiveness to society, as well as a
high level of professionalism and quality on the part of its members. This sec-
tion discusses judicial councils as devices to ensure both independence and ac-
countability.
A. Judicial Councils in Civil Law and Common Law Systems
Judicial councils are bodies designed to take appointment and promotion of
judges away from the partisan political process, while ensuring some level of
accountability. Judicial councils fall somewhere in between the polar extremes
of letting judges appoint their own successors and maintain internal responsibil-
ity for judicial discipline, and the alternative of complete political control of ap-
pointments, discipline, and promotion. The first model of judicial self-selection
arguably errs too far on the side of independence, while pure political control
may make judges too accountable, in the sense that they will consider the pref-
erences of their political principals in the course of deciding specific cases. As
an intermediate body between politicians and judges, the judicial council pro-
vides a potential device to enhance both accountability and independence.
There are a wide variety of models of councils, in which the composition and
competences reflect the concern about the judiciary in a specific context.
One possible model is that pursued by France when the first High Council
of the Judiciary (Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature) was established in 1946,
in the aftermath of the Vichy regime and World War 11.13 This Council, which
has been maintained under Article 64 of the 1958 French Constitution, was in
charge of managing judicial personnel, but only a minority of members were
themselves magistrates elected directly by fellow judges. 14 In 1958, Italy be-
came the first country to create a judicial council (Consiglio Superiore della
Magistratura) designed to completely remove the entire judiciary from political
control, a model that served subsequently for other judiciaries.' 5 Spain and Por-
tugal have slightly different models, introduced after the fall of their dictator-
(1997). See also BURBANK & FRIEDMAN, supra note 9.
12. See, e.g., Francesco Contini & Richard Mohr, Reconciling Independence and Accountabil-
ity in Judicial Systems, 3 UTRECHT L. REV. 26 (2007) (Neth.); Wim Voermans, Judicial Transpar-
ency Furthering Public Accountability for New Judiciaries, 3 UTRECHT L. REV. 148 (2007) (Neth.);
Daniela Piana, From Judicial Independence to Judicial Accountabilities (unpublished manuscript, on
file with authors) (arguing that political insulation does not preclude accountability to other institu-
tions that could be social in nature).
13. Although we characterize France and Italy as establishing the modem judicial council, a
precursor for judicial councils is the use of formal nominations committees composed of various
governmental officials. See, e.g., Albanian Constitution art. 136, 147 (judicial nominations from a
special committee of judges and other governmental officials).
14. See Cheryl Thomas, Judicial Appointments in Continental Europe, Lord Chancellor's De-
partment, Research Series 6/97, 1997. Further discussion in section IV.C. infra.
15. See Thomas, supra note 14. For further discussion, see infra Section IV.D.
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ships in the mid 1970s, in which judges constitute a significant proportion of the
members.16 These councils have final decision-making in all cases of promo-
tion, tenure, and removal. Judicial salaries are also technically within their au-
thority but usually tempered by the department in charge of the budget (typically
the Ministry of Finance). The power of high-ranking magistrates has been dra-
matically reduced in most of these countries (as a consequence of the appoint-
ment of junior-ranking judges to the judicial council), and strong unions or
judicial associations have emerged. 7
The French-Italian model has been exported to Latin America and other
developing countries.' 8 Indeed, the World Bank and other multilateral donor
agencies have made judicial councils part of the standard package of institutions
associated with judicial reform and rule of law programming.' 9
The motivating concern for adoption of councils in the French-Italian tradi-
tion was ensuring independence of the judiciary after periods of undemocratic
rule. To entrench judicial independence, most of these countries enshrined the
judicial council in their constitution. Independence, however, is a complex and
multifaceted phenomenon. Even though judges may be independent from po-
litical control, they may become dependent on other forces, such as senior
judges in a judicial hierarchy, with just as much potential to distort individual
decision-making as more conventional political influence.20 In civil law coun-
tries, in particular, a large proportion of judges are recruited directly from law
school using some form of public examination, with no or limited requirements
of previous professional experience.2 This model emphasizes socialization
16. See Carlo Guamieri, Judicial Independence in Latin Countries of Western Europe, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CR ITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE
WORLD Il l (Peter H. Russell & David M. O'Brien eds., 2001).
17. A good summary can be found in THIERRY RENOUX, LES CONSEILS SUPERIEURS DE LA
MAGISTRATURE EN EUROPE 320 (2000). See Willem de Haan, Jos Silvis & Philip A. Thomas, Radi-
cal French Judges: Syndicat de la Magistrature, 16 J.L. & SOC'Y 477 (1989), for an explanation of
the role of the unionization of the judiciary in France. See also infra Sections IV.C., IV.D.
18. See e.g., Rebecca Bill ChAvez, The Appointment and Removal Process for Judges in Ar-
gentina: The Role of Judicial Councils and Impeachment Juries in Promoting Judicial Independ-
ence, 49 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC'Y 33 (2007) (Arg.).
19. See Linn Hammergren, Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial Reform? Lessons from Latin
America (Camegie Endowment Rule of Law Series, Working Paper No. 28, 2002). See also Pedro
C. MagalhAes, The Politics of Judicial Reform in Eastern Europe, 32 COMP. POL. 43 (1999) (dis-
cussing the judicial institutional design in Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland and how it relates to the
bargaining process between the different political actors); Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Putin's Judicial
Reform: Making Judges Accountable as well as Independent, 11 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 117 (2002)
(discussing the reforms to the Judicial Qualification Commission); Lauren Castaldi, Judicial Inde-
pendence Threatened in Venezuela: The Removal of Venezuelan Judges and the Complications of
Rule of Law Reform, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 477 (2005) (discussing the current situation in Venezuela).
20. See Owen M. Fiss, The Right Degree ofIndependence, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN
LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 55 (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993) (focusing on inde-
pendence within the judicial hierarchy).
21. Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Discretion in the Career and Recognition Judiciary, 7 CHI.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 205 (2000).
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within the ranks of the judicial profession and creates the potential for institu-
tional pressures on judges to decide individual cases in ways that are at odds
with their own consciences or reading of the law. Perhaps because of concerns
over this structural problem, external accountability emerged at some point as a
secondary goal of councils.
For example, some civil law countries, such as Germany, Austria, and the
Netherlands, have judicial councils with fewer competences than in the French-
Italian model.22 These councils are limited to playing a role in selection (rather
than promotion or discipline) of judges or are heavily influenced by regional and
federal governments. The political impact of these councils on the judiciary has
been less clear than in the four European countries utilizing the French-Italian
model.23
The councils in civil law jurisdictions vary in their relationship with the
Supreme Court. In some countries, such as Costa Rica and Austria, the judicial
council is a subordinate organ of the Supreme Court tasked with judicial man-
agement.24 In other countries, judicial councils are independent bodies with
constitutional status.25 Further, in some countries they govern the entire judici-
ary, while in others councils only govern lower courts.26
Recruitment of the judiciary in common law countries has traditionally
drawn from more senior lawyers, who have a wider range of previous experi-
ence and socialization than do judges in the civil law jurisdictions. 27 These ju-
diciaries are sometimes characterized as "recognition" judiciaries, because
judges are appointed in recognition of their professional accomplishments. 28
Therefore, external accountability has been a major motivating factor in shaping
the design of judicial appointment systems. Compared to civil law judges,
common law judges have relatively few opportunities for advancement, and
hence there is less capacity for political authorities to use the promise of higher
office to influence judicial decision-making. Accordingly, common law ap-
pointment processes have received serious attention, since judges are fairly im-
mune from pressures once appointed. In the UK, the Constitutional Reform Act
2005 created the Judicial Appointments Commission, which is responsible for
22. See infra Section IV.F on the Netherlands and recent reforms.
23. See Thomas, supra note 14.
24. See infra Section IV.B. See also Hammergren, supra note 19, at 10 (Costa Rica). On
Austria, see EXTERNAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE AUSTRIAN JUDICIAL
SYSTEM (2006) (judges are appointed by the Federal Ministry of Justice by recommendation of the
president of a court of appeal).
25. Data on file from Comparative Constitutions Project.
26. Hammergren, supra note 19, at 13 (Colombia).
27. Georgakopoulos, supra note 21. Debate in common law countries tends to focus on the
merits of the appointees and diversity concerns. See, e.g., Kate Malleson, Selecting Judges in the
Era of Devolution and Human Rights, in BUILDING THE UK's NEW SUPREME COURT: NATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 295 (Andrew Le Sueur ed., 2004).
28. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 21.
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appointments based solely on merit.29 There remains, however, a good deal of
debate regarding the compatibility of the merit principle with other functionalist
goals, such as affirmative action or promoting diversity of certain attributes
across the judiciary.30 The advantages of a Judicial Appointment Commission
have also been at the heart of the debate in New Zealand and in Australia, where
judicial appointments are still in the competence of the Attorney General. Cur-
rently, judicial appointment protocols have been developed with the aim of en-
hancing independence and external accountability (by including mandatory
consultation with several office holders).31
Within the common law world, the case of Singapore is also noteworthy.
There is a Legal Service Commission in Singapore, headed by a Registrar who
reports to the Chief Justice, but the Commission's role is limited to supervising
the placement of subordinate court judges and magistrates. 32  Although the
Chief Justice is directly involved in judicial appointments, by recommending
candidates for lower courts and consulting on appointments to the Supreme
Court, this hardly guarantees independence. The Chief Justice is well paid and
tends to help ensure not only high quality justice in ordinary cases but also sub-
servience in politically charged cases, which is the core characteristic of Singa-
pore's judiciary. 33
B. Balancing Independence and Accountability
This brief survey illustrates that it is clearly impossible to eliminate politi-
cal pressure on the judiciary. While adequate institutions might minimize the
problems of a politicized judiciary and enhance judicial independence, increas-
ing the powers and independence enjoyed by judges risks creating the opposite
problem of over-judicializing public policy, since judicial decisions have an im-
29. See infra Section IV.G.
30. For a discussion on the extent to which merit selection is consistent with affirmative action
in the judiciary, see Kate Malleson, Rethinking the Merit Principle in Judicial Selection, 33 J.L. &
Soc'Y 126, 127-140 (2006). See also Kathleen A. Bratton & Rorie L. Spill, Existing Diversity and
Judicial Selection: The Role of Appointment Method in Establishing Gender Diversity in State Su-
preme Courts, 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 504 (2002) (presenting empirical evidence that appointed systems of
judicial selection produce more diversity than election systems).
31. Empirical analysis is provided by Mita Bhattacharya & Russell Smyth, The Determinants
of Judicial Prestige and Influence: Some Empirical Evidence from the High Court ofAustralia, 30 J.
LEGAL STUD. 223 (2001) and Pushkar Maitra & Russell Smyth, Judicial Independence, Judicial
Promotion and the Enforcement of Legislative Wealth Transfers -An Empirical Study of the New
Zealand High Court, 17 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 209 (2004). See also John M. Williams, Judicial Inde-
pendence in Australia, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note
16, at 173 (making the point that while the structural guarantees are quite robust and few
attempts have made to remove judges, there are serious proposals for reforming).
32. See Kim Teck Kim Seah, The Origins and Present Constitutional Position of Singapore's
Legal Service Commission, 2 SING. ACAD. L.J. 1 (1990).
33. Gordon Silverstein, Singapore: The Exception that Proves Rules Matter, in RULE BY LAW:
THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 73 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds.,
2008).
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portant impact on politics and government. 34 It is our view that the periodic re-
forms of judicial appointments and management that we observe within and
across countries reflect a dialectic tension between the need to de-politicize the
judiciary and the trend toward judicializing politics. Independence is needed to
provide the benefits of judicial decision-making; once given independence,
judges are useful for resolving a wider range of more important disputes. As the
judiciary begins to take over functions from democratic processes, however, the
pressure for greater accountability mounts.
When judges have little influence over public policy and politics, concerns
over independence tend to dominate, and reformers may push for a move from a
politically dependent, weak judiciary to a strong, self-regulated judiciary. This
shift gives rise to a judiciary that has some control over its own affairs. Fre-
quently, though not inevitably, judges use this independence to increase their
influence over public policy, perhaps because of exogenous events. However,
once politics is judicialized in a significant way, pressures arise for greater po-
litical accountability. The judiciary remains strong but is subject to more over-
sight and control. Sometimes these pressures for more accountability can lead
to assaults on judicial independence, particularly if a small group of principals is
able to control the process of supervision. In such circumstances, a politically
accountable, strong judiciary may revert back to a politically dependent, weak
judiciary, as in a rising authoritarian regime. This dynamic framework provides
a tool for understanding the various institutional adjustments observed in differ-
ent countries.
Institutional configurations can be stable for long periods of time, and judi-
ciaries need not shift their location in the framework. What we believe, how-
ever, is that there is a potential cycling among different models of judicial
governance, and hence changes in the nature of the pressures that judiciaries
face in particular configurations. We expect that judicial councils, in particular,
will develop reforms to respond to different pressures for accountability and in-
dependence.
III.
THEORY
This section presents a theory ofjudicial councils drawn from the economic
concept of principals and agents. 35 Judicial councils are monitoring devices de-
signed to maintain the relationship between the principal, society, and its agents,
34. Stephen Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability and Interbranch Rela-
tions (U. Pa. L. Sch., Working Paper No. 102, 2006), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/102 (arguing that judicial independence in the United States is
at a tipping point because of a characterization of judicial politics as ordinary politics).
35. On principal-agent models, see Eric Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics, in
CHICAGO LECTURES ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 225 (Eric Posner ed., 2000).
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the judges. But the actual incentives faced by judges depend on the particulars
of the institutional setup, which varies across countries.
A. Judicial Councils as Intermediaries Between Principal and Agent
In this section, we develop a principal-agent model of judicial councils.
We treat judges as the agents and society as the principal, on whose behalf the
judges exercise power. The standard problem that arises in principal-agent
models is produced by information asymmetry: as the agent's expertise in-
creases, her potential effectiveness increases as well, but her accountability de-
creases. There is thus a risk that the agent will act in accordance with her own
preferences rather than those of the principal.
The judicial council is an intermediate body analogous to regulatory agen-
cies in the regulatory literature 36 and boards of directors in the corporate litera-
ture.37 Just as shareholders utilize a board as a system to provide representative
intermediate governance for corporations, the public may wish to set up (and
pay for) a judicial council to manage judicial agents. Like a board, the council
might have a representative appointment system, where different stakeholders
have agents who then negotiate governance in order to minimize possible rents
created by asymmetric information. The council thus serves as an intermediary-
trustee whose role is both to exercise expert oversight and to filter out political
influence. 38
Generally speaking, there are two types of stockholders within the princi-
pal: a majority (the general public), which is vastly uninformed and uninterested
in monitoring the judicial agents because the opportunity costs to information
acquisition are high, and a very well informed minority with leverage to influ-
ence agents (interest groups that would like favorable decisions by courts, as
well as lawyers). The principle of judicial independence aims to avoid possible
capture by the minority and also to align the interests of the judges with those of
the majority, the general public. But given the asymmetry of information be-
tween the vast majority on one hand and the minority, as well as the judges, on
the other hand, an intermediate body might be necessary to limit opportunism
and minimize agency costs. The judicial council serves as just such a body. Its
role is to limit agency costs and reduce the likelihood that an informed minority
will use the court system to its advantage vis-a-vis the vast majority of the popu-
lation.
Asymmetry of information and specialization may create a new problem,
however, namely the capture of the judicial council by the judiciary itself or by
36. JEAN-JACQUE LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT
AND REGULATION (1993).
37. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS (2002).
38. The intermediary is also, of course, an agent of the principal, whose job is to control an-
other agent. Notice that the intermediate body is paid by the principal, the taxpayers, as in the usual
economic model.
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an external body that wishes to manipulate the judiciary. This is the classic
question of "who guards the guardians? ' 39 Therefore, periodic reforms may be
required to correct deviations when a judiciary becomes either too accountable
or too independent. We imagine that judicial governance requires learning by
doing to some extent and that as new agency problems materialize, there may be
shifts among governance structures to try to rectify them.4 °
An important point to take into account in understanding council structure
is the interaction between preferences, incentives, and politicization. When ap-
pointed judges are subject to any form of political scrutiny, we should expect
some alignment between the preferences of the judicial power and the political
power (even if this alignment is lagged due to political cycles). In this case, we
observe ex ante politicization, in which judges are screened for political criteria.
Alternatively, we can have ex post politicization through pressure or corruption
after the judge is appointed. Our conjecture is that a judicial council aims at
controlling both, but councils may have different emphases depending on the
institutional problem they face. In stable systems such as the United States,
where ex post interference with judicial independence is rare and frowned upon,
the screening function may be more important. On the other hand, where norms
of judicial autonomy are less developed, the council may play a greater role in
preventing ex post politicization.
B. Judicial Incentives
To understand why councils might be effective, we first need to understand
the incentive structures of the judicial agents. Judges have preferences and a ca-
reer structure that generates certain types of incentives. With respect to prefer-
ences, we should assume that judges have the same set of preferences as
everybody else, as Judge Posner has argued.41 Obviously judges, like others,
care about their income. They may be more risk-averse and may care more
39. MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATION (1988) (administrative law).
40. F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in State
Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 431-62 (2004).
41. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing as Every-
body Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993); Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Per-
formance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259 (2005); Richard A. Posner, The
Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049 (2006). See also Frank H.
Easterbrook, What's So Special About Judges?, 61 U. COL. L. REV. 773 (1990); Mark Cohen, The
Motives for Judges: Empirical Evidence from Antitrust Suits, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 13 (1992);
Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68
U. CIN. L. REV. 615 (2000); Gordon R. Foxall, What Judges Maximize: Toward an Economic Psy-
chology of the Judicial Utility Function, 25 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 177 (2004); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski and Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 1 (2007). For a different perspective, see Laurence Baum, What Judges Want: Judges'
Goals and Judicial Behavior, 47 POL. RESEARCH Q. 749 (1994) and LAURENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND
THEIR AUDIENCES (2006).
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about non-monetary payoffs than the average individual, and hence they select
the stable, prestigious judicial career instead of the practice of law. Therefore,
we expect judges to be quite sensitive to changes in prestige or social influence
(judicial independence is very important here) and to shifts in risk (for example,
in promotion or evaluation of performance).
To understand why an intermediate body may be a useful mechanism for
controlling agents, we need to consider alternatives that might operate to restrain
judicial opportunism. These alternatives include the market and direct external
control by the principal. Standard market-oriented mechanisms do not work to
constrain judges because judges operate in a highly-subsidized monopoly (the
court system), without market discipline. While individuals can opt out of the
state-provided system and use alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such
behavior is unlikely to have a significant effect on the welfare of the judiciary.
Another possible mechanism is direct control by principals. Generally, how-
ever, external enforcement of constraints on judges is weak because external ac-
tors typically have trouble verifying whether judges have actually followed the
law or not. Furthermore, external enforcement potentially reduces judicial inde-
pendence and therefore is constrained through structural insulation of the judici-
ary. For these reasons, we cannot rely on external or market-oriented
mechanisms to limit opportunism in the judicial system.
Judicial careers are structured differently in different parts of the world. In
civil law countries, judges tend to operate in bureaucratic hierarchies and spend
their entire career in the judiciary. Whoever controls advancement in this career
hierarchy is thus very important. For example, in Japan, the Secretariat of the
Supreme Court plays a very important role in assigning judges to different posts,
and thus has a good deal of influence on performance. 42  For "recognition"
judges, 43 such as those in common law systems or those appointed to constitu-
tional courts in civil law countries, prestige among the public or with other
branches of government is very important, but once selected into the judiciary,
these judges have relatively few opportunities for advancement. They may
therefore be less sensitive to external pressures and performance evaluations
from any source, including judicial councils." We expect that judicial councils
42. J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003) (documenting political manipulation of judicial
career structures in Japan). But see David M. O'Brien & Yasuo Ohkoshi, Stifling Judicial Independ-
ence from Within: The Japanese Judiciary, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF
DEMOCRACY, supra note 16, at 37 (making the point that Ramseyer and Rasmusen have mis-
understood the manipulation of the judiciary in Japan as political by the ruling party when it
is merely bureaucratic by the faceless General Secretariat of the court system).
43. See text supra at note 28.
44. Measuring the performance of judges has been the object of some work but is still quite
underdeveloped. Whereas quantitative (workload measures) and qualitative measures (reversal rates
in appeal courts) are by now largely developed, complexity is still a problem (even the use of cita-
tions is still the object of discussion). See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of
Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REv. 299 (2004); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Su-
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in common law countries will focus on appointments rather than promotions,
which are relatively rare.
C. Judicial Councils as Monitoring Devices
We believe that judicial councils should be viewed as devices to reduce
agency costs in the judiciary, although we do not assert that they are necessary
or sufficient bodies to accomplish this task. In this section, we describe the
membership and extent to which powers are shared with other branches of gov-
ernment and the Supreme Court.
The council is composed of three possible agents: (i) members of the ma-
jority (laymen); (ii) members of the minority (lawyers, politicians, and law pro-
fessors); and (iii) judges (who are analogous to inside directors in a
corporation). 45 It is important to note that in most situations, clearly distinguish-
ing between laymen and politicians is impossible, since they are all usually ap-
pointed by other branches of government.46 Judges on the Council are typically
appointed by the Supreme Court or by other courts, while lawyers are appointed
by the law society or bar association. The council is theoretically accountable to
the public, but different accountability rules will make the council more or less
likely to be captured by the judiciary (which might promote professional inter-
ests) and/or minority stockholders (who might promote lobbying or minority in-
terests).
We expect that the mechanism of appointment of judicial members in the
Council will matter for outcomes. In some cases, all members of the council are
appointed by the same body (for example, the Parliament); in other cases, differ-
ent bodies of government intervene in the appointment process. A more hetero-
geneous Council will result when different bodies are involved in the
appointment of the Council, either by a sequential process of nomination and
confirmation (members of the council must appeal to different constituencies) or
by a quota system where different bodies of government appoint a pre-defined
number of members.
The size, appointment, and type of composition of judicial councils are
therefore important. Even when the judges are not a numerical majority in the
council, however, they might have a dominant or preponderant role. To start
preme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judicial Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004);
Florida State University Law Review Symposium Issue on Empirical Measures of Judicial Perform-
ance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (2005).
45. If the judges are Supreme Court judges, the council may tend to focus on the power strug-
gle between government and Supreme Court and on maintaining a vertical hierarchy within the judi-
ciary. However, if they are lower court judges, we should expect a relatively smaller role for the
Supreme Court (which might be welcomed by the government). We have observed an increasing
role of judicial associations (unions), which are motivated by the need to coordinate the interests of
the junior judges to undermine the traditional vertical hierarchy.
46. In fact, laymen in many types of council are lawyers, law professors or legally educated
individuals, hardly the standard example of independent laymen.
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with, most members of a judicial council must rely on information provided by
the judiciary itself. In addition, a judicial council does not exert direct control
over the judiciary (which would hurt the independence of judiciary), but exer-
cises a configuration of powers that mix authority and accountability. This con-
figuration is usually complex and full of uncertainties that call for expertise by
judges. Furthermore, as between judicial and non-judicial members of the
council, asset specificity is asymmetric, meaning that judges may have particu-
larly strong incentives to represent judicial interests on the council. After their
service on the council, judges will return to their professional careers inside the
judiciary, whereas non-judges will go back to their careers outside of the judici-
ary, which may or may not have any relationship with judicial management is-
sues. Perhaps this is why we observe very little correlation between the number
of judges on the council and the level of independence.47
D. Institutional Setup
The role and importance of the judicial council depend very much on the
institutional setup in place. Depending on the preferences and empowerment of
the judiciary, the monitoring activity of the council can be more or less exten-
sive. Take performance measurement, for example. First, apart from the tech-
nicalities of devising an adequate metric to evaluate judicial performance,
judges might have different reactions to measuring performance, depending on
whether it is likely to affect their career structure and their risk attitudes, as well
as their social influence and role in the community. Second, performance meas-
ures could reduce the influence and power of senior judges by limiting their
ability and discretion to shape the judiciary for the next generation. They could
also create an imbalance of power among the different actors within the council.
Finally, the relevance of measuring performance might be understood to varying
degrees by the other branches of government and the population in general.
Therefore, transplanting particular roles of a judicial council, and ignoring local
determinants, might generate unexpected results. Furthermore, certain complex
functions, such as performance evaluation, might be subject to very different
understandings or interpretations depending on the institutional setup.
At the same time, demand for a judicial council is intrinsically linked to the
importance and functioning of the legal system as a whole. The salience of ju-
dicial quality will be related to the judges' own powers within a given legal sys-
tem. The more extensive the judges' powers, the more important it becomes to
address any potential conflict between the common good and judicial incentives.
The conjunction of judicial attributes, politics, and peer-pressure becomes more
important as the institutional setup is more prone to change as a result of judicial
47. Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 7. See also Stefan Voigt, The Economic Effects of Judi-
cial Accountability: Cross-Country Evidence, 25 EuR. J.L. ECON. 95 (2008) (arguing that judicial
accountability explains differences across per capita income but without specifying the nature of
judicial councils).
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review. 48 The less important the judiciary is in a given institutional setup, the
less need for achieving the appropriate balance between independence and ac-
countability. Thus, we predict that judicial councils will have greater compe-
tences but fewer judges when judges have a good deal of power (for example,
the power of judicial review of legislation). This is because there will be exter-
nal demand from the public and other constituencies for monitoring of the rela-
tively powerful judiciary. Where judges have less power, outside actors may be
more accepting of a council with a majority of judges, but seek to assign it fewer
competences.
IV.
CASE STUDIES
The above hypotheses suggest the need to focus on a more dynamic model
of council structure. Clearly the effects are not linear. Rather, there is a com-
plex relationship between council structure and political incentives of the vari-
ous actors at the time. This section describes the operation of judicial councils
in a number of different countries to determine whether our argument withstands
scrutiny.
A. United States
Judicial selection in the United States has gone through several waves.49 In
the early years of the nation, legislative appointment systems dominated. In the
mid- 19th century, however, partisan elections were introduced in many states, in
response to concerns of capture. In our framework, this shift reflected the rise of
the uninformed majority within the principal, as citizens responded to concerns
of capture by the minority. However, partisan elections led to their own set of
problems. Rather than truly arising from the people, judicial candidates came to
be controlled by party bosses.50
In many American states, concern over traditional methods of judicial se-
48. Among others, see INSTITUTIONAL GAMES AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (James R.
Rogers et al. eds., 2006); Timothy Besley & A. Payne, Judicial Accountability and Economic Policy
Outcomes: Evidence from Employment Discrimination Charges (Institute for Fiscal Studies, Work-
ing Paper W03/1 1, 2003); Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 256
(2005); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1992); Tom Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional
Courts, THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW, 2002 at 3; Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-
Regarding Legislation through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 223 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 50 (1987); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Econ-
omy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157 (1999).
49. Hanssen, supra note 40; Goldschmidt, supra note 5.
50. New York faces a similar problem today, leading a judge to bring a lawsuit to allow her to
run for a higher court without securing the blessing of party bosses. See Mark Hansen, Questioning
Conventional Behavior, 93 A.B.A. J. 21 (Apr. 2007).
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lection (either appointment by politicians or direct election by the public) led to
the adoption of "Merit Commissions" to remove partisan politics from judicial
appointments and base selection on merit. 5' These emerged as a model in the
early 2 0th century, reflecting the progressive movement's belief in technocratic
government. Merit Commissions can be seen as analogous to judicial councils,
though their scope of activity may be more limited. Since in common law sys-
tems, the judiciary is not a "career judiciary" in the civil law sense, there is less
interest in having independent commissions handle discipline, promotions, and
reassignments, and thus greater emphasis is placed on initial appointments. Yet
the basic institutional design-namely setting up non-partisan mixed bodies to
screen and select judicial candidates-is identical to the judicial commission.
Sometimes called the "Missouri Plan" (although some assert that it was
first adopted in California) or "Merit Plan," this system features a non-partisan
judicial selection commission composed of judges, lawyers, and political ap-
pointees.52 A famous 1906 speech by Roscoe Pound inspired this institution,
and it is consistent with early-twentieth-century beliefs in the value of technoc-
racy and administrative insulation from politics. 53  In some states, the Merit
Commission is exclusively responsible for nominating judges, while in other
states, it sends a set of candidates from which the Governor chooses appointees.
Merit Plan judges are typically subject to uncontested retention elections, which
judges rarely lose.54 While American states exhibit a variety of approaches, it is
clear that the merit plan has become the dominant model within the United
States. As Hanssen put it, "[t]here is today a strong consensus that, of all the
procedures, the merit plan best insulates the state judiciary from partisan politi-
cal pressure. 55 As of 1994, 23 states used Merit Plans for initial appointments
to the Supreme Court56 with most states adopting these institutions in the 1960s
and 1970s.
57
51. With respect to the federal judiciary, see Charles Gardner Geyh, Customary Independence,
in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at 160 (discussing the historical
foundations of the norms against court packing, namely the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Midnight
Judges Act of 1801 and its repeal in 1802, and the Roosevelt Court-Packing Plan of 1937).
52. In Missouri, the Commission has seven members: the Chief Justice, three lawyers elected
by the bar from different appellate districts, and three laypersons appointed by the Governor. For an
analysis, see Hanssen, supra note 1.
53. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice,
20 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 178 (1937).
54. Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One Best Method?, 23 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1995); Reddick, supra note 4, at 10 (noting only 33 judges lost retention elections
in the entire United States between 1942 and 1978).
55. Hanssen, supra note 40, at 452.
56. Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1, 20 (1994).
57. Hanssen, supra note 40.
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A general assumption in the literature is that Merit Plan systems serve to
expand judicial independence. 58 For example, Hanssen tests the effect of parti-
san division on appointment and retention systems, assuming that Merit Plan
implementation correlates with independence. 59 He finds that, broadly speak-
ing, states using Merit Plans tend to have higher levels of political competition
(and hence more presumed demand for judicial independence) than those using
partisan elections. 60 Hanssen also finds that states switch to Merit Plans when
they have increased party competition and policy differences between parties.
This is consistent with literature that emphasizes the role of partisan competition
in incentivizing judicial independence. 6'
Nevertheless, we know of no study that has demonstrated an actual im-
provement in judicial independence or quality after the adoption of a Merit Plan,
and the actual impact on judicial quality is debatable. 62 In a comprehensive re-
view of the social-scientific literature, Reddick concludes that there is little sup-
port for "proponents' claims that merit selection insulates judicial selection from
political forces, makes judges accountable to the public, and identifies judges
who are substantially different from judges chosen through other systems.' 63
We view the merit plan as a device to mediate between independence and
accountability in accordance with our theory. As a common law country with
judges who tend to be appointed relatively late in life, the United States has little
need for independent bodies to engage in promotion of judges. Thus, the com-
missions play a relatively limited role, but one that focuses on the crucial locus
of partisan pressure, namely the appointment process. This illustrates the impor-
tance of understanding institutional variation in conditioning demand for the ju-
dicial council model.
58. See, e.g., Reddick, supra note 4 (reviewing literature).
59. Hanssen, supra note 1, at 721.
60. For at least one indicator, both these methods have less political competition on some indi-
cators than the residual category of "other" appointment methods (such as legislative or gubernato-
rial appointment). See id. at 720 ("In 95 percent of partisan election states the same party controlled
both houses of the legislature, versus in 87 percent of merit plan states and 81 percent of other
states.").
61. J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 721 (1994).
See also Tom Ginsburg, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (2003); Mathew Stephenson,
When the Devil Turns... : The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review 32 J. Leg. Stud.
59 (2003); Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvestova, Selecting Selection Systems, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at 191 (arguing that selection systems are de-
termined by political uncertainty and risk; empirical evidence seems to confirm that as political un-
certainty has decreased, more accountability has expanded as the main goal of judicial selection).
62. Webster, supra note 54; Henry R. Glick, The Promise and Performance of the Missouri
Plan: Judicial Selection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 509 (1978). See also Choi, Gulati
& Posner, supra note 6; infra Section VI.A.
63. Reddick, supra note 4, at 744.
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B. Brazil
The Brazilian judiciary has been traditionally decentralized in a model
greatly influenced by the United States.64 Although decentralization has serious
administrative and financial advantages, it has also created serious drawbacks in
terms of effective disciplinary action and accountability of court administration
(including nepotism in court staff appointments). 65
Brazil's first judicial council was the National Council of the Magistracy
(Conselho Nacional da Magistratura, or CNM), which was created through con-
stitutional amendment in 197766 and established in 1979. This council had
seven judges chosen by the Federal Supreme Court out of its members. The
primary function of the council was purely disciplinary, and it had no budget or
administrative functions. The constitutional amendment was quite limited in
empowering the council. At the time, Brazil was under a military dictatorship,
and though it gave some formal powers to judges, the council was likely created
to assert greater control over the judiciary.67 The shift toward the CNM meant
that judges had some formal control over their affairs, but in law and in practice
this was quite limited. Rather, using the Supreme Court as a proxy, the military
was able to restrain lower court judges while preserving nominal judicial auton-
omy. 68 The CNM served as an intermediate body to facilitate control of agents
by the principal.
In 1985, the dictatorship fell. With the passage of the Brazilian Constitu-
tion of 1988, the CNM was eliminated, leaving judges self-governing and sub-
ject to virtually no oversight. Constitutional guarantees of independence went
into effect. In addition, the complexity of the 1988 Constitution delegated many
types of controversies to the judiciary, including the so-called "constitutionaliza-
tion" of private law through recognition of the social functions of property and
contracts. While judges had formally enjoyed the power of constitutional re-
view even under the former constitution, the actual exercise of the power was
highly constrained. The 1988 Constitution, by constitutionalizing many aspects
of public life and maintaining constitutional review, provided an opportunity
structure for a major increase in judicial power.69
Judges utilized these new opportunities to expand their influence. In time,
the combination of little oversight and expanded scope of activity led to increas-
ingly judicialized politics.7v  This naturally produced demands for greater ac-
64. See the discussion by Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira in Reforming the Bra-
zilian Supreme Federal Court: A Comparative Approach, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV. 99
(2006).
65. Id.
66. Emenda Constitucional N.7, art. 120 (Braz.).
67. See Oliveira, supra note 64.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Rog~rio B. Arantes, Constitutionalism, the Expansion of Justice and the Judicialization of
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countability. Many academics and even judges criticized the politicization of
the judiciary in Brazil. There was, however, great controversy over the type of
mechanism that should be used to ensure accountability. Some associated the
judicial council with the dictatorship; indeed, this was likely the reason for its
abolition in 1988. 71
A 2004 constitutional amendment introduced a new judicial council (Con-
selho Nacional de Justiqa) with a very different composition from its predeces-
sor: nine judges, two prosecutors, two lawyers, and two laymen appointed by the
legislature.72 The competences of the new council include not only disciplinary
action, as with the previous CNM, but also oversight of the budget and adminis-
trative matters (for example, providing statistics about the workload and produc-
tivity of the judiciary).73
The politics of the adoption are telling. It was initially proposed by a
member of the then-opposition in the year 2000. The proposal did not see the
light of day, however, until the election of Lula de Silva to the presidency in
2003. Incoming politicians may feel the need to impose greater discipline on the
judiciary, particularly if it is seen as being aligned with their opponents; more
generally, changes in power can lead to efforts to institutionalize judicial inde-
pendence so as to provide insurance for those who are likely to lose in future
rounds.7 4 One can interpret the creation of the Brazilian judicial council from
either perspective. The new left coalition may have believed that the uncon-
strained judiciary was more likely to support their political opponents and thus
used the council to discipline the judiciary. Alternatively, the coalition may
have wanted to institutionalize an accountable independent judiciary to make it
more viable for the long term, since a system of alternating parties seemed to be
developing.
The Brazilian story illustrates that there is no necessary connection be-
tween judicial councils and judicial independence. Though formally designed to
provide the appearance of independence, the 1977 version of the judicial council
did little to constrain potential military interference with the courts. Indeed, ju-
dicial independence was in one sense greatest between 1988 and 2004, when
judges enjoyed a vastly expanded domain of governance but had little oversight.
The recent reforms are a promise of a strong but politically accountable judici-
ary. It remains to be seen, of course, whether this materializes.
Politics in Brazil, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 231 (Rachel Sieder et al.
eds., 2005).
71. See Oliveira, supra note 64.
72. Emenda Constitucional N. 45, art. 103B (Braz.).
73. Id.
74. GINSBURG, supra note 61; Ramseyer, supra note 1.
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C. Israel
In Israel, judges are appointed by a mixed council established under the
Basic Law on the Judiciary, passed in 1984. 71 Under that system, new justices
are chosen by a nine-member panel, which includes two government ministers,
two members of the Knesset, two Bar Association representatives, and three sit-
ting justices, including the court president.76 The judges, although a minority,
dominate the process in practice, and a new justice has never been chosen over
the objection of sitting justices. 77  This is the paradigm of a self-regulating,
strong judiciary, even though judges are not the majority on the Council. Pro-
fessor Ran Hirschl convincingly argues that the creation of the entrenched judi-
ciary, like other steps taken in the 1990s to constitutionalize certain policies,
reflected the desire of a powerful but declining "hegemonic" group to ensure
that their policies would survive their electoral losses. 78 The inclusion in this set
of reforms of a judicial council to enhance independence fits our overall story of
councils as tools for increased judicial autonomy.
As our framework suggests, the power of the judiciary has led to calls for
greater accountability. Judicial activism by the Supreme Court under recently
retired President Aharon Barak has prompted fierce debate over whether the sys-
tem needs revision. 9 Observers have noted increasing judicialization since the
late 1980s. 80 In 2000, Israel created a committee to revisit the system of ap-
pointing judges, but it proposed only modest changes, such as making the nomi-
nations more transparent. 81 Many believe that the Israeli Supreme Court has
been too activist, and if this trend continues, we anticipate renewed calls for
structural reforms to rein in the judiciary. 82 Making the council a stronger body,
75. Basic Law: Judicature §§ 1-24. This replaced the Judges Act (1953) as the primary statute
governing judicial appointments.
76. Id. at § 4.
77. Levinson, supra note 11, at 1306; Eli M. Salzberger, Judicial Appointments and Promo-
tions in Israel: Constitution, Law and Politics, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL
POWER, supra note 2, at 241, 248. Salzberger believes that the crucial factor is the majority of ju-
rists on the committee and the majority of judges among the jurists.
78. RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
NEW CONSTITUTION (2004).
79. Salzberger, supra note 77 at 242, 249. Salzberger characterizes Barak as shifting the court
from a formalist conception of law to a more values-based jurisprudence.
80. Shimon Shetreet, The Critical Challenge of Judicial Independence in Israel, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 16, at 233 (pointing to changes in the rules
of justiciability and standing, judges leading commissions of inquiry into corruption, administration,
police acts, oil drilling operations, and the judicial and legal consequences of security considera-
tions).
81. Salzberger, supra note 77, at 252-53.
82. Binyamin Blum, Note: Doctrines Without Borders: The "New" Israeli Exclusionary Rule
and the Dangers of Legal Transplantation, 60 STANFORD L. REV. 2131, 2164 (2008); Amos N.
Guiora & Erin M. Page, Going Toe to Toe: President Barak's and Chief Justice Rehnquist's Theo-
ries ofJudicial Activism, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 51 (2005).
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with more autonomy from the judiciary, would be a first step.
D. France
The French approach to the organization of judicial councils has been iden-
tified by many as a role model. 83  The French judicial council, Conseil Su-
perieur de la Magistrature (CSM), was created after World War II in 1946,
when the Fourth Republic Constitution established a council headed by the
President of the Republic with the Minister of Justice as its vice-president.
8 4
The creation of the Fifth Republic reinforced the power of the President.8 5 The
Constitution, adopted by referendum, led to some reforms in the judicial council,
namely in terms of the composition of its members. The President of the Repub-
lic and Minister of Justice remained the president and vice-president of the
council, respectively, and nine members were to be appointed by the Presi-
dent.86 Until the 1990s, the powers of the council were basically limited to the
nomination of high level magistrates, and the council was influenced by the
President of the Republic and by senior judges. The senior judges played a very
significant role in determining the careers of junior judges. By the early 1990s,
the judicial council was facing serious criticism for being dominated by the in-
terests of the executive and for excluding junior judges. 87
The Constitutional Reform (Loi Constitutionelle) in 1993 and Constitu-
tional Amendment (Loi Organique) in 1994 brought changes in terms of mem-
bership, method of appointment, powers, and operating procedures of the
council. Among the principle changes were the election of magistrate members
of the council; the creation of two "formations" or committees, one with juris-
diction over the judges (sijge)88 and the other over public prosecutors (parquet);
the appointment of four members common to both formations by the "high au-
thorities" of the State;8 9 the election of the other 12 members (six on each for-
83. See Dories Marie Provine & Antoine Garapon, The Selection of Judges in France: Search-
ingfor a New Legitimacy, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 77, at
176. See also J. Bell, Principles and Methods of Judicial Selection in France, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1757 (1988).
84. Six members were elected by the National Assembly, four magistrates chosen by their
peers and two members appointed from the judiciary by the President of the Republic.
85. This is the current republican constitution, which replaced a parliamentary government by
a semi-presidential system. In the Fifth Republic, most of the traditional powers of the Minister of
Justice were reinstated.
86. These members could be appointed directly by the President of the Republic (two qualified
prominent figures), or by nomination of the officers of the Cour de Cassation, the French Supreme
Court for civil and criminal cases (six members) and the General Assembly of the Conseil d'[tat,
the French Supreme Court for administrative justice (a Conseiller appointed by the Conseil d'ttat).
87. See Doris Marie Provine, Courts in the Political Process in France, in COURTS, LAW AND
POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 177, 203 (Herbert Jacob et al. eds., 1996).
88. The French Constitution grants the judges a status that guarantees their independence and
security of tenure.
89. These are the President of the Republic, the Presidents of the two Parliamentary Chambers
2009]
74 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
mation) by the judiciary; and the allocation of new competences related to the
nomination of Presidents of the Tribunaux de Grande Instance. Although the
French Constitution refers to the existence of a judicial council and its composi-
tion, this body is covered mainly by ordinary legislation. 9"
The reforms in the 1990s were clearly driven by political events that have
empowered the judiciary. Generally, the Fifth Republic had maintained the tra-
ditional principles of the French judiciary, namely the subordination of the judi-
ciary to the executive and the legislature (the judiciary was not considered a
power but a mere authority) and individual and collective judicial self-restraint
(characterized by docile compliance with the doctrines of state supremacy and
political sovereignty). However, there were some cases of conflict in the late
1960s and 1970s. 91 The consolidation of judicial review by the Constitutional
Council in the mid-1970s had a major and enduring impact. The sharp increase
in litigation (even administrative), helped by the criminalization of many activi-
ties (extending the scope of application of the European Convention of Human
Rights), increased the influence of the French judiciary.92
Several political scandals gave the judiciary an important influence over
politics. France, lacking a history of well-known famous judges, was now faced
with a new kind of celebrity. 93 Judges who were motivated and willing to inves-
tigate corruption scandals and to confront political pressures became heroes of
sorts.94 It is clear, nevertheless, that many of these affairs were pursued by indi-
vidual judges, while the French judiciary as a whole remains very self-
restrained. 95
It is possible that the cohabitations96 in France have weakened the execu-
(the Senate and the National Assembly) and the General Assembly of the Conseil d'Etat.
90. According to the French Constitution, there must be ordinary legislation regulating the
functioning of the Council. See Law No. 94-100 of Feb. 5, 1994, Journal Officiel de Ia Rfpublique
Franqaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Feb. 8, 1994, p. 2146; CC Decision No. 93-337 DC,
Jan. 27, 1994, J.O. 1776; Decree No. 94-199 of Mar. 9, 1994, J.O., Mar. 10, 1994, p. 3779.
91. See Vincent Wright, The Fifth Republic: From the Droit de 1'ttat to the lttat de droit?, W.
EUR. POL., Oct. 1999, at 92 (reporting several famous scandals that generated serious clashes be-
tween the French government and the judiciary, including the Ben Barka affair, the murder of the
Prince of Broglie in 1977, the suicide of the Labor Minister in 1979, and the famous Canard En-
chain affair).
92. ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1992) (explaining that the process of empowerment of the
French judiciary started in the early 1970s).
93. See Provine, supra note 87, at 204.
94. Id. (comparing famous American and French judges).
95. See Provine & Garapon, supra note 83, at 205.
96. France was ruled by right-wing administrations for more than 20 years. Franqois Mitter-
rand became the first elected Socialist President of France in 1981, but after the loss of his party's
majority in the French National Assembly in 1986, he had to live in cohabitation with the conserva-
tive government of Jacques Chirac. In the legislative elections of 1993, due to economic recession,
consecutive scandals, and divisions on the left, Edouard Balladur became Prime-Minister. This gave
rise to the second cohabitation of Mitterrand's presidency. Jacques Chirac became President in 1995
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tive, as the powers of the Minister of Justice have been reduced in relation to the
judiciary and the Council's powers have increased. 97 French politicians, how-
ever, retain a good deal of influence over the judiciary, especially compared to
their counterparts in Spain and Italy. 98 On several occasions, different Ministers
of Justice have come into conflict with the judiciary "when they have tried to
hush up 'affairs' linked to their respective parties." 99 As the political system
became more competitive in the 1980s and early 1990s, pressure built for judi-
cial reforms that assured more independence. Nevertheless, the involvement of
high profile politicians in scandals and the increasing prominence of judges and
judicial review have initiated a debate about the lack of external accountability
of the judiciary. According to Val6ry Turcey, a member of the CSM, the in-
creasingly prominent role of the judiciary in French society was reflected in
large debates about the role of the CSM in particular. 00 The long French his-
torical tradition of hostility to an independent and powerful judicial branch no
doubt played a role in keeping France from shifting to full judicialization of
public policies, and hence led to increased control over judicial behavior.' 0'
E. Italy
Although it had been approved after World War I and envisaged in the
Italian Constitution of 1948,102 the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura
(CSM) was not officially created until 1958 and fully operational until 1959. 103
The Constitution defines the existence, composition, and tasks of the CSM, but
it also states that rules governing the judiciary and the judges are laid out by or-
dinary law. 0 4 According to the Italian Constitution, the Council is in charge of
and replaced Balladur with Alain Jupp6. The third cohabitation started in 1997, when the President
dissolved the Assembly and Lionel Jospin became Prime-Minister, constraining Chirac's political
influence.
97. Thomas, supra note 14.
98. See Vronique Pujas & Martin Rhodes, Party Finance and Political Scandals in Italy,
Spain and France, W. EUR. POL., July 1999, at 41 (explaining political corruption in Italy, Spain and
France and the role of the judiciary; in the French case, looking at the accumulated and distributed
kickbacks during the Gaullism and the Socialist governments).
99. See id. at 59.
100. Val6ry Turcey, Le Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature Franqais: Bilan et Perspectives,
75 REVISTA DEL PODER JUDICIAL 539 (2004).
101. The French antipathy for a powerful and activist judiciary is discussed by Burt Neubome,
Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United States, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 363
(1982); Michael H. Davis, The Law/Politics Distinction, the French Conseil Constitutionnel and the
U.S. Supreme Court, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 45 (1986); STONE, supra note 92.
102. The Italian Constitution came into force in January 1948.
103. Law No. 195 of Mar. 24, 1958, Gazz. Uff., Mar. 27, 1958. See generally Mary L. Volcan-
sek, Judicial Selection in Italy: A Civil Service Model with Partisan Results, in APPOINTING JUDGES
IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 77, at 159.
104. Law No. 195 of Mar. 24, 1958, reformed by Law No. 44 of Mar. 28, 2002, Gazz. Uff.,
Mar. 29, 2002, sets the composition and functioning of the CSM.
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the employment, assignment, transfer, promotion and disciplining of judges. 105
The Constitution pays special attention to the autonomy and independence of the
judiciary, in reaction to executive dominance during the fascist period. The Ital-
ian judicial system is notable for its near-absolute independence, in which the
CSM controls virtually all aspects of judicial appointment and the conditions of
the judicial career. 0 6 The balance of power within the CSM is clearly in the
hands of the judiciary, and as we explain below, because the internal hierarchy
of the judiciary has largely been undermined, all decisions on the status of mag-
istrates are made by the CSM.
The Italian story is one in which judges gradually dismantled the classical
hierarchical structure of the civil law judiciary. Beginning in the 1960s, judges
formed unions, demanding better conditions and freedom from constraints im-
posed by higher levels of the judiciary. This gradually led to a removal of hier-
archical controls. Although in theory the CSM was set up to ensure a certain
level of consistency within the judiciary, the quality of judges varied widely.
Apparently, the CSM's professional evaluations of the judges were of little sig-
nificance because they were always positive, and promotions almost never de-
pended on vacancies. 10 7  The dismantling of the traditional hierarchy was
reinforced by several reforms that took place between 1963 and 1979.1°8 Be-
tween 1979 and 1992, the role of the CSM was consolidated, with the unions
assuming an increasingly important role.'0 9 Judicial investigations into several
scandals involving businessmen, politicians, and bureaucrats marked the period
from 1992 to 1997, raising questions about the accountability of judicial pow-
ers. 110
Public debates began to grow, centered on the appointment of judges and
the organization of the judiciary, with the aim of preventing runaway judges
from conducting over-zealous prosecutions. As a result, the composition of the
Council was altered in 2002. The total number of members was reduced to 24
105. Since administrative jurisdiction is assigned to bodies separated from the ordinary courts,
there is also a council for administrative judges, the Consiglio di Presidenza della Magistratura
Amministrativa.
106. See Thomas, supra note 14; Levinson, supra note 11 (stating that the Italian system exhib-
its a maximalist notion of judicial independence).
107. Guamieri, supra note 16, at 116-17.
108. Id.
109. Id. If we refer to the role of the judicial associations, there are four that are crucial in elec-
tions to the CSM. Since 1990, no judicial representatives to the CSM have been elected without the
backing of one of the following groups (from left to right on the political spectrum): Magistratura
democratica; Movimento per la giustizia; Unita per la Constitutzione; Magistratura indipendente.
There is also another association, Articolo 3-1 Ghibellini, but it has less influence. These five asso-
ciations comprise the Associazione Nazionale Magistrati (ANM).
110. Patrizia Pederzoli, The Reform of the Judiciary, in ITALIAN POLITICS: Quo VADIS? 153
(Carlo Guarnieri & James L. Newell eds., 2005); David Nelken, The Judges and Political Cor-
ruption in Italy, in THE CORRUPTION OF POLITICS AND THE POLITICS OF CORRUPTION 95-
112 (Michael Levi & David Nelken eds., 1996).
[Vol. 27:1
JUDICIAL COUNCILS
from 33. In addition to 16 ordinary judges and prosecutors chosen from various
levels in the hierarchy, eight university law professors and lawyers with a mini-
mum of 15 years experience in the legal profession were appointed by the Italian
Parliament. "
The Italian case is similar to the French case, although the Italian Council is
more dependent on the executive, with narrower competences, and reflects rela-
tively slower decline of the influence of judicial hierarchy. Both fit well into
our dynamic model, which first predicts excessive politicization as a result of
granting extensive independence to the judicial power and next predicts that se-
rious accountability issues will be raised once judicialization of party politics
becomes notable (in both Italy and France, due mostly to political scandals).
New judges with media attention (Garzon in Spain, Jean-Pierre in France, and
Di Pietro in Italy) have pushed judicialization of politics as never seen before in
these countries."12 Thus, in the immediate future, the problem will be the extent
to which the judicial agenda is sustainable once it does not coincide with the
media agenda. "1
3
F. The Netherlands
The Netherlands' model has differed from that of France and Italy. The
government has recently introduced important reforms to ensure more transpar-
ency and accountability, but these did not result from high profile political scan-
dals. Historically, the Dutch judiciary has been very restrained; judicial review
doctrines in the Netherlands were similar to the British principle of Parliamen-
tary sovereignty. The 1956 constitutional reform paved the way for more judi-
cial activism. The purpose of this reform was to accommodate the
developments in European Economic Community law at the time, and the con-
sequences were far-reaching. As a result, the main source of judicial activism
has been the enforcement of the European Convention on Human Rights. 114
The selection of judges in the Netherlands combines the appointment sys-
tem typical of common and civil law: half of the judges are young university
graduates and the other half experienced members of the legal profession." 5
The Ministry of Justice shares the power of selecting the members of the judicial
selection boards with both the judiciary and the legislature. 116
111. Guarnieri, supra note 16, at 116-117.
112. See id. at 126.
113. Seeid.atlO.
114. See TIM KOOPMANS, COURTS AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 76-
84 (2003) (describing the growth in power of the Dutch judiciary).
115. Thomas, supra note 14.
116. Also note that the existence of the Dutch Association of the Judiciary, Nederlandse
Vereniging voor Rechtspraak. It defines itself as "the independent trade association and union of
judges and public prosecutors." The NVvR advises the Ministry of Justice and participates in inter-
national organizations, and at the end of 2004, it had 3244 members.
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The judicial system in the Netherlands was substantially reformed in Janu-
ary 2002. A significant change was the creation of the Council for the Judiciary
(Raad voor de Rechtspraak),ll7 a committee primarily responsible for organiz-
ing and financing the Dutch Judiciary. However, these roles of the Council are
limited by the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) and the Administrative Juris-
diction Division of the Council of State (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak Raad van
State). And while the Council has only five members, it maintains an office to
assist it in its activities that employs around 135 people. 118 The acts of the
Council are not subject to any control. The Council was granted certain admin-
istrative powers previously in the hands of the Ministry of Justice, in an effort to
reinforce the independence of judiciary authority with respect to the legislature,
the Parliament, and the Government. "1
9
The Dutch case is a good example of a judicial system in which no serious
concerns about excessive politicization have arisen, and yet, certain reforms
have sought to introduce more accountability and better allocation of resources.
G. The United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the Act of Settlement 17 0 1 120 confirmed the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, and since then, strong norms of judicial immunity
have made the removal of judges quite difficult. However, appointments re-
mained in the hands of the Lord Chancellor. 12i The traditional view was that the
Lord Chancellor represented the judiciary in the government and the govern-
ment in the judiciary, and hence was a unique office well placed to represent the
view of each side. 122 Gradually, though, the Lord Chancellor's position became
an exclusively political office. The emphasis in judicial selection was increas-
ingly on professional experience; few judges appointed to English higher courts
had any political experience. 123 Although the independence of the English judi-
117. The creation of the Council for the Judiciary followed the Leemhuis Commission's advice
to the Minister of Justice in the 1998 report Updating the Administration of Justice.
118. Three members come from the judiciary and two from senior positions at a government
department.
119. See MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR AND KINGDOM RELATIONS, THE STATE OF OUR
DEMOCRACY (2006).
120. Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 W. & M. 3, c. 2. (1700) (Eng.).
121. For example, Robert Stevens in his book mentions several important episodes of political
interference with the judiciary (including the right of the Crown not to reappoint judges on the
change of a monarch) but notes the declining role of the judiciary until the 1960s. He argues that the
development of high formalism that protected the English judiciary from possible political interfer-
ence made the judiciary increasingly irrelevant. See ROBERT STEVENS, THE ENGLISH JUDGES:
THEIR ROLE IN THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 1-29 (2005).
122. See Johan Steyn, The Case for a Supreme Court, 118 LAW Q. REV. 382 (2002) (finding
unconvincing the argument in favor of maintaining this office simply because, in practice, the Lord
Chancellor delegates judicial business to the Law Lords).
123. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Courts, Justice and Politics in England, in COURTS, LAW AND
POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 87, at 81, 90-91. Less than 13% had parlia-
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ciary was not perceived to be significantly affected by this arrangement, some
Lord Chancellors have been seriously criticized in the press for having policies
that were too politically oriented. 124 At the same time, infrequently but in im-
portant legislative discussions, the senior judiciary sitting at the House of Lords
participated in lawmaking, and so the roles of legislator and judge were com-
bined. '25
The English Judiciary was never perceived to be a separate branch of gov-
ernment in the American sense. 12 6  Furthermore, a system dependent on the
Lord Chancellor created a unified and hierarchical judiciary. Such structure did
not promote diversity of opinions, since someone who did not conform to the
views of the establishment was not likely to be chosen by the Lord Chancel-
lor. 127
The English judiciary's increasing importance reflected changes in the po-
litical environment after the 1960s, including the expansion of the welfare state,
the Labor governments,' 28 the creation of the Industrial Relations Court by Ed-
mentary experience in the 80s; between 1832 and 1906, it was 58%.
124. STEVENS, supra note 121, at 30-61, 100-194, discusses the relationship of particular Lord
Chancellors to politicization, arguing that Lord Kilmuir (1954-1962) represented the first important
shift (he was a man of the traditionalist right of the Tories who opposed the abolishment of the death
penalty); that Lord Gardiner (Lord Chancellor with Wilson's Labor governments from 1964 to 1970)
served as the greatest reformist by advancing the Labor's agenda; and that Lord Hailsham (Lord
Chancellor with Edward Heath from 1970 to 1974 and with Mrs. Thatcher's government from 1979
to 1987) marked the second important shift in politicization (in part through his controversial ap-
pointments to the bench), followed actively by Lord Mackay (Lord Chancellor with Mrs. Thatcher's
government from 1987 to 1992 and with Major's government until 1997), Lord Irvine (Lord Chan-
cellor with Blair's government from 1997 to 2003), and Lord Falconer (Lord Chancellor with Blair's
government from 2003 to 2007). Stevens' accounting leaves the impression of an increasing politi-
cization of the role of Lord Chancellor. A similar thesis is presented by Steyn, supra note 122, who
argues that the vast increase in the nature and extent of the Lord Chancellor's executive responsibili-
ties has increasingly politicized the office.
125. For example, senior judiciary members voted against the Irish Treaty (1922), criminal sen-
tencing reforms (in the 1940s and 1950s), divorce law reforms (in the 1970s), trade union and labor
relations bill (1975), police and criminal evidence bill (1984), courts and legal services bill (1989),
human rights bill (1995), legislation concerning hunting (2001) and constitutional reform (2004).
Occasionally, a Law Lord has introduced a bill (for example, in 1987, Lord Templeman introduced a
bill on land registration). The convention that active and retired Law Lords are not supposed to dis-
cuss political matters is controversial.
126. See J.A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY 281-343 (5th ed. 1997) (arguing
that the myth of neutrality has undermined the building-up of a strong judiciary). Griffith defends a
political role of the judiciary in areas such as law and order or social issues. See also STEVENS, su-
pra note 121, at 76-99; ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICES IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED
STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1990).
127. See Andrew Le Sueur, The Conception of the UK's New Supreme Court, in BUILDING THE
UK's NEW SUPREME COURT, supra note 27, at 3 (observing lack of sufficient transparency in such a
system); Kate Malleson, Selecting Judges in the Era of Devolution and Human Rights, in BUILDING
THE UK's NEW SUPREME COURT, supra note 27, at 295 (noting that a career judiciary in the UK
could attract less reputation but more transparency).
128. See GRIFFITH, supra note 126, at 65-102.
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ward Heath, and the arrival of Mrs. Thatcher and her legal reforms. 129 Public
law was profoundly transformed after the 1960s. Europe also played an impor-
tant role. European integration in 1973 and the development of EU law have
progressively empowered the English judiciary to review legislation in the light
of EU directives or regulations, sometimes against the will of the government
(in particular, Mrs. Thatcher's government from 1979 to 1992). That has very
much contributed to a bolder judiciary confronted with the enlargement of the
scope of judicial review.130 Seniorjudges challenged the doctrine of Parliamen-
tary sovereignty. 131 Furthermore, the new role of the judiciary in the face of the
domestic and international challenges of the late 1970s and 1980s raised con-
cerns about the extent to which the English judiciary was up to the tasks ex-
pected of it. 132 This reflected gradually increasing demands for accountability
of a self-regulating, independent judiciary.
Sentencing policy is a particularly sensitive issue, which has come under
scrutiny in the aftermath of the Human Rights Act 1998. ' The Pinochet case
in 1999 raised serious questions about the wisdom of having the most senior ju-
diciary sitting in the House of Lords. 3 4 Finally, the case of McGonnell v. UK135
in the European Court of Human Rights, regarding the Bailiff of the island of
Guernsey, gave impetus to movements to reform the judicial structure. In that
case, the Court decided that a judge who also plays an administrative role vio-
lates Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights (although in fact,
in England and Wales, the Lord Chancellor has traditionally avoided sitting on
cases where there might be a conflict of interest). 136
129. Id.
130. See Lord Woolf, Judicial Review -The Tensions between the Executive and the Judiciary,
114 LAW Q. REV. 579 (1998) (recognizing that slowly, executive-friendly judicial review has been
replaced by a more intense review with higher standards of scrutiny and willingness to intervene,
albeit in the absence of other constitutional safeguards). Lord Woolf was a Master of the Rolls, the
senior civil judge in the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, from 1996 to 2000.
131. See J.A.G. Griffith, The Common Law and the Political Constitution, 117 LAW. Q. REV.
42 (2001) (making the argument that there are two sovereignties, those of Parliament and of the
courts).
132. See a personal account by Lord Denning, a Law Lord and Master of the Rolls from 1962
to 1982, in LORD DENNING: THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW (1975). A controversial judge, Lord Denning
defended that the principles of common law as laid down by the judges were not suited for the late
20'h century. His most relevant personal contributions were on contract laws and negligence stan-
dards. For example, his defense of the rule of law doctrine in fundamental breach in 1978 (then
Master of the Rolls) was overturned by Lord Wilberforce (then a Law Lord) in favor of the rule of
construction doctrine.
133. See STEVENS, supra note 121.
134. The contradictory decisions taken by different panels of three Law Lords were not easily
understood by the public. For a detailed account, see STEVENS, supra note 121, at 100-118. See
also Robert Stevens, Judicial Independence in England: A Loss of Innocence, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 16, at 155.
135. McGonnell v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 289 (2000).
136. Id.
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More generally, judges' extrajudicial activities, including leading commis-
sions and inquiries and producing reports, have been the source of controversy.
In many important cases, the appointed judges encountered politically sensitive
issues. Judicially-led commissions included those on the Profumo affair in
1963,137 industrial relations in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, 138 the Nolan com-
mittee on standards in public life in the aftermath of sleaze scandals (1994-
1995), the Scott inquiry on exports of military equipment to Iran and Iraq (1995-
1996), and the Hutton inquiry on the death of an employee of the Ministry of
Defense and the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (2003-2004). 139
In 2003, Prime Minister Tony Blair's Government announced its intention
to alter the system for appointing judges in England and Wales. 140 Two goals
justified the reform: improving judicial independence and enhancing account-
ability and public confidence in judicial offices. 14 1 In fact, Lord Falconer, Sec-
retary of State for Constitutional Affairs, declared that it was no longer
acceptable for the executive branch to control judicial appointments. Accord-
ingly, he revealed the intention to establish an independent Judicial Appoint-
ments Commission (JAC) responsible for recommending candidates for judicial
appointments on a more transparent basis and based solely on merit. 142
The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 143 introduced several substantive
changes in the English and Welsh judiciaries, including a statutory duty on gov-
ernment members to not influence judicial decisions. Two reforms were espe-
cially far-reaching. First, the Act abolished the position of Lord Chancellor, the
most senior judge in England and Wales, and transferred his judicial functions to
the President of the Courts of England and Wales (formerly known as Lord
Chief Justice of England and Wales). 14 4  Second, it created a new Supreme
Court, consisting of 12 judges independent of and removed from the House of
Lords, with their own independent appointment system. 1
45
137. Headed by Lord Denning. Griffith, supra note 131. Profumo was a Minister of Defense
who shared a lover with a Russian military aide. This created a well-known scandal in the UK. See
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Profumo.affair (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
138. Headed by Lord Wilberforce and Lord Widgery respectively. Griffith, supra note 131.
139. See GRIFFITH, supra note 126, at 14-29.
140. In the case of Scotland, judicial appointments were under review since September 1999
and an independent Judicial Appointments Board was established in June 2002.
141. See Diana Woodhouse, The Constitutional Reform Act 2005: Defending Judicial Inde-
pendence the English Way, 5 INT'I J. CONST. L. 153 (2007).
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. The President of the Courts of England and Wales sits in the Court of Appeal, the High
Court and the Crown Court, among others, is responsible for expressing the views of the judiciary
and for welfare, training and guidance of the English judiciary. He is not the President of the Su-
preme Court.
145. The new Supreme Court is to be launched in 2009 with the current twelve Law Lords (the
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary). There will be a Supreme Court ad hoc selection committee presided
by the President of the Supreme Court for future appointments. The remaining Lords of Appeal who
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Alongside the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC), 146 the Constitu-
tional Reform Act 2005 established two new bodies: the Judicial Appointments
and Conduct Ombudsman (JACO)147 and the Directorate of Judicial Offices for
England and Wales (DJO). The JAC is composed of 15 commissioners drawn
from the judiciary, the legal profession (one barrister and one solicitor), the lay
magistracy, and the lay public. The Chairman of the Commission is required to
be a lay member.
It seems to us the most important issue in the discussion in the United
Kingdom has been enhancing accountability. As predicted by our model, the
growth of judicial review and the perception that judicial interference has sig-
nificantly increased has raised concerns about accountability. 4 8 One important
concern is the lack of minorities and women in the bench, which suggests a
sense of gender and racial bias in the appointments mechanism. 149 Also, there
has been a general feeling that a small clique from Oxford and Cambridge
dominates the appointments. 150  Furthermore, there have been indications of
personal and corporate bias in judicial profiles.' 5'
Our model predicts that reforms aimed at improving accountability might
sacrifice independence. Not surprisingly, in the UK, the extent to which current
reforms actually improve judicial independence seems to be a matter of de-
bate. 152 In fact, it is unclear how the current reforms will conform with the tra-
ditional notion of the English judiciary as a separate branch of government. 153
are members of the House of Lords and eligible to hear and decide judicial business under the Ap-
pellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 will not be moved to the Supreme Court (in January 2007 there were
thirteen of them including three former Lord Chancellors).
146. The JAC started selecting judges in April 2006. KATE MALLESON, THE LEGAL SYSTEM
245-46 (2005), argues that the JAC is effectively dominated by the judiciary. The fact that the coun-
cil is chaired by a non-lawyer does not seem to counter a strong judicial membership. The tradi-
tional role of the Lord Chancellor in judicial appointments was the object of a study by Anthony
Bradney, The Judicial Activity of the Lord Chancellor 1946-1987: A Pellet, 16 J.L. & SOc'Y 360
(1989).
147. The JACO is responsible for investigating and making recommendations concerning com-
plaints about the judicial appointments process and the handling of judicial conduct complaints and
discipline. It is completely independent of the government and of the judiciary.
148. See, e.g., Robert Stevens, A Loss of Innocence? Judicial Independence and the Separation
of Powers, 19 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 365 (1999); Matthew Flinders, Mechanisms of Judicial Ac-
countability in British Central Government, 54 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 54 (2001).
149, There is only one woman as Lord of Appeal in Ordinary (Baroness Hale).
150. For an empirical analysis, see Jordi Blanes & Clare Leaver, An Economic Analysis of Judi-
cial Diversity Part I.- Judicial Promotions (Oxford Univ. Working Paper, April 2006), available at
http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/members/clare.leaver/Judicial-promotions.pdf. See also GRIFFITH,
supra note 126, at 18-21; Kritzer, supra note 129, at 92.
151. See GRIFFITH, supra note 126, at 63-259.
152. Concerns about the extent to which the present reform enhances judicial independence
have been echoed by Sue Prince, The Law and Politics: Upsetting the Judicial Apple-Cart, 57
PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 288 (2004).
153. See Robert Stevens, The Independence of the Judiciary: The Case of England, 72 S. CAL.
L. REV. 597 (1999) (making the point that the office of the Lord Chancellor makes it impossible to
[Vol. 27:1
JUDICIAL COUNCILS
V.
CONCLUSION
Judicial councils are an important new phenomenon that have spread all
over the world and become a global best practice, yet we know little about them
and their consequences. The conventional wisdom is that they enhance judicial
independence, but we are skeptical of this claim. From an economic perspec-
tive, councils are designed to resolve principal-agent problems. As an interme-
diate body between the principal (the public) and an agent (judges), the judicial
council aims to reduce agency costs due to the possible capture by a minority
that may distort the judicial process for its own purposes. From this point of
view, a judicial council is an expert monitor designed to ensure accountability
rather than independence.
We recognize that the diversity in council structures across countries re-
flects local conditions. We have canvassed institutional designs in both com-
mon-law judicial appointment commissions, including the Merit Plans in the
United States and the Canadian and British experiences, and civil-law high judi-
cial councils, including the French-Italian model. We have argued that the dif-
ferent designs aim at achieving the appropriate balance between independence
and accountability in the face of two recurrent phenomena, the politicization of
the judiciary and the judicialization of politics that are reflected in different de-
grees around the world.
These findings have important implications for the ongoing debate on judi-
cial appointments in the United States. Rather than assume that merit commis-
sions, the American counterpart to judicial councils, always enhance
independence, scholars should conduct more thorough empirical research to un-
derstand the precise determinants of independence. Our case studies suggest
that these determinants are highly context-specific, and not susceptible to one-
size-fits-all solutions.
have a concept of separate branches of government, but no political party will give judges the right
to simply strike legislation).
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